



To a lawyer, who is not an expert on disarmament, it would seem clear that
any arms limitation or arms reduction agreement is merely a piece of paper
ready to be ignored or torn up whenever it suits someone's interest unless there
are institutions available to interpret that document and to enforce its provi-
sions.
While attention should naturally be given to the technical side of arms
limitation, a great deal more attention must be given (a) to a method for veri-
fying and enforcing whatever arms agreements are made; (b) to the legal
framework for resolving disputes that will inevitably arise; and (c) to the
development of an adequate world security system to maintain peace.
In 1961, the United States and the Soviet Union signed a "Joint Statement
of Agreed Principles for Disarmament Negotiations." This is known as the
McCloy-Zorin Agreement. Paragraph 6 of that agreement reads: "To imple-
ment control over and inspection of disarmament, an international disarma-
ment organization including all parties to the agreement should be created
within the framework of the United Nations. This international disarmament
organization and its inspectors should be assured unrestricted access without
veto to all places, as necessary for the purpose of effective verification."
The concept of an international disarmament verification agency appears to
have been ignored or at least put on the back burner in the current arms con-
trol negotiations. One suspects that it is because the negotiators are reluctant
to face squarely the knotty question of whether and how often on-site inspec-
tion should be permitted. The Soviet Union has traditionally feared that on-
site inspection would be a subterfuge for spying. Rather than force the issue,
United States arms control advocates have tended to rely on good faith and on
national technological means for verification, e.g., satellite surveillance.
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However, if one side accuses another of violating an arms agreement, either
side should be able to obtain verification of whether a violation has or has not
occurred. This may entail some on-site inspection. It should be done by an in-
ternational agency rather than by a national agency, since that would do much
to relieve the spying argument.
Furthermore, while limitations of in-place strategic delivery launchers may
lend themselves to satellite surveillance, limitations on the number of nuclear
warheads clearly do not. And when we move from arms limitation to arms
reduction, international verification becomes all the more important.
The first essential ingredient for disarmament, therefore, is the creation of
an independent International Disarmament Organization with adequate
authority to inspect and to verify the disarmament process at each stage.
Unless all nations have confidence in the accuracy and fairness of such interna-
tional verification, the arms race will continue, with each side using as its ex-
cuse its own allegations of the other side's violations.
The voting structure of the International Disarmament Organization also
deserves attention. The McCloy-Zorin Agreement referred to "unrestricted ac-
cess without veto." The Draft Treaty presented by the Soviet Union in 1962
for General and Complete Disarmament under Strict International Control
provided for a Control Council to be governed by a two-thirds majority. The
United States counterproposal set forth an outline for a General Conference of
all parties to the treaty, a Control Council of the major signatories plus others
on a rotating basis, and an Administrator. In short, both the United States and
the Soviet Union appeared in the early 1960s to recognize that neither side
should be able to block international verification by use of a veto.
Nothing came of these disarmament proposals, because neither side was
ready for the "general and complete disarmament" they envisaged. It is sub-
mitted that any kind of arms reduction short of general and complete disarma-
ment, to be effective, also requires the creation of an international arms reduc-
tion verification agency unhampered by the veto.
A second essential ingredient for disarmament is the development of alter-
native means for resolving disputes other than war. Paragraph 7 of the
McCloy-Zorin Agreement reads: "Progress in disarmament should be accom-
panied by measures to strengthen institutions for maintaining peace and the
settlement of international disputes by peaceful means." Such international
disputes are of two kinds: One involves disputes over the interpretation of the
disarmament treaty itself. (Fpr example, are cruise missiles to be considered
within the scope of the limitations on ballistic missiles?) The other involves
disputes outside of the disarmament area which might lead to war if allowed to
fester.
There are two mechanisms within the present charter of the United Nations
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for resolving disputes. Both are inadequate in their present stage of develop-
ment.
Article 33 mandates that the parties attempt to resolve disputes through con-
ciliation, mediation and arbitration; but there is no trained conciliation or
mediation service within the U.N. framework, nor is there a existing United
Nations Arbitration Panel, much less a procedure whereby one party to a
dispute can invoke either binding or non-binding arbitration. Suggestions for
correcting these deficiencies have been made by the Philippine Government to
the Special United Nations Committee on the Charter and on Strengthening
the Role of the Organization. Their proposal, which has been annexed to the
Committee's report as part of a sixteen-nation package of United Nations
reforms, envisages a permanent Mediation and Arbitration Commission com-
posed of outstanding citizens of the world, such as past presidents of the
General Assembly. The Security Council would also have authority under the
Philippine proposal to require parties to a dispute to submit to arbitration.
The other mechanism within the United Nations system for resolving
disputes is the International Court of Justice (ICJ). Composed of fifteen
judges who sit at The Hague, it unfortunately hears only a few cases a year,
which nations agree to submit to it. The chief reason for its non-use is that
most nations have attached stringent reservations which permit them to decide
on a case-by-case basis whether to accept the jurisdiction of the court.
The sixteen-nation United Nations reform package would remedy this by
authorizing the United Nations itself to institute suits in the court and by
allowing any one nation to request an advisory opinion of it. One way to avoid
the present impasse would be to write into each disarmament treaty a provision
that would provide for automatic referral to the ICJ in the event of any dispute
over the meaning of any portion of the treaty. Such an approach has been tried
in other treaties and in fact was recommended by the Senate when it adopted
the Cranston-Taft Resolutions in 1974.
This would solve the problem of disputes over interpretation of the treaty
itself, but it would not solve other disputes that could lead to war. If they are
to be resolved without armed conflict, the dispute-resolving machinery of the
United Nations must be vastly improved.
The third essential ingredient for disarmament is a strong international
peacekeeping force to prevent hostilities from erupting during the dispute-
settlement process. We must develop a world security system so that nations
will feel safe from attack by their neighbors and will not feel compelled to rely
on their own arms.
The United Nations Charter envisages a permanent peacekeeping force, not
the small ad hoc arrangements that were used by the United Nations in the
Suez, Congo and Cyprus crises. The Government of Columbia has proposed
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the creation of such a force as part of the sixteen-nation U.N. reform package.
Few can doubt the importance of a strong U.N. peacekeeping force in pro-
viding security in a disarmed world. Unless there is such a force, nations will
be extremely reluctant to disarm.
Again the McCloy-Zorin Agreement underscores this point. It reads: "Dur-
ing and after the programme of general and complete disarmament, there
should be taken, in accordance with the principles of the United Nations
Charter, the necessary measures to maintain international peace and security,
including the obligation manpower necessary for an international peace force
to be equipped with agreed types of armaments. Arrangements for the use of
this force should ensure that the United Nations can effectively deter or sup-
press any threat or use of arms in violation of the purposes and principles of
the United Nations."
In conclusion, disarmament cannot and should not be discussed in a cocoon
or in a vacuum. It is intertwined with the viability of international institutions.
Disarmament cannot succeed without the creation of an effective International
Disarmament Organization and without substantial reforms in the peacemak-
ing and peacekeeping part of the United Nations system.
We probably have very little time to accomplish this. It is unrealistic to
believe that nuclear weapons, soon to be possessed by as many as fifteen na-
tions, will never be used. An accident, a madman, or an eyeball-to-eyeball con-
frontation when no one backs down could trigger nuclear use any day. Ber-
trand Russell wrote an epitaph for humankind which goes: "Ever since Adam
and Eve ate the apple, man has never refrained from any folly of which he was
capable. The end." Whether we commit the ultimate folly of nuclear self-
destruction is a question this generation will decide.
With the special United Nations session on disarmament coming in 1978,
there is some hope that the world will focus its attention on the need for disar-
mament and for an effective International Disarmament Organization. With
the recent work of the Special United Nations Committee on the Charter, there
is some hope that the United Nations will finally get down to the business of
reforming and restructuring its outmoded institutions. To bring the two con-
cepts together in a successful union-disarmament and the building of more
effective global institutions-will take special insight and tremendous dedica-
tion.
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